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The Profound Political but Elusive Legal Legacy of
Justice Anthony Kennedy’s LGBT Decisions
MATTHEW COLES†
This talk focuses on Anthony Kennedy’s legacy as a Justice in the LGBT
cases that he wrote for the Supreme Court. There are four cases in which the
Supreme Court recognized important constitutional rights for LGBT people;
they were all written by Anthony Kennedy. Those decisions are part of one of
the great social movements for change of modern times. Because they’re part of
that movement, they represent a powerful political and social legacy. But a
jurisprudential legacy . . . not so much.
There’s the Romer v. Evans case in 1996 in which the Court said that the
people of Colorado could not take away government’s power to pass laws
protecting LGBT people from discrimination.1 In the Lawrence v. Texas case in
2003, the Court said that Texas could not make certain forms of intimate
sexuality a crime if the participants are a same-sex couple.2 There’s United
States v. Windsor in 2013, in which the Court struck down as unconstitutional
the so-called Defense of Marriage Act.3 In that Act, the federal government said
even if your state thinks you’re married, we don’t for all federal purposes if
you’re a same-sex couple.4 Finally, in the 2015 decision in Obergefell v. Hodges
the Court ruled that states had to allow same-sex couples to marry.5
First, let’s look at the political legacy.
Romer halted a national effort by the right wing to essentially derail the
political LGBT movement.6 The point of the effort was to amend state
constitutions to make sure that LGBT people could not get political change
† Professor of Practice, U.C. Hastings; J.D., U.C. Hastings, B.A. Yale University. Mr. Coles is the former
Deputy National Legal Director of the American Civil Liberties Union, and from 1995 until 2010 he was
Director of its LGBT Project. This Essay is based on remarks delivered at the Hastings Law Journal’s
Symposium, which focused on the jurisprudence of Justice Kennedy.
1. 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996).
2. 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003).
3. 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
4. Id. at 769–70.
5. 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015).
6. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 623–24, 626 (holding that Amendment 2—the Colorado constitutional
amendment at issue, which would have prohibited “all legislative, executive or judicial action” to protect LGBT
persons—violated the Equal Protection Clause because the amendment was based on the desire to harm LGBT
persons).
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through state legislatures, state executive branches, or state courts. Romer
stopped the campaign to strip government of the power to respond to the LGBT
political movement dead. That was of major importance to a movement that,
given the Court’s decision in Bowers v. Hardwick,7 was largely a politicallyfocused movement.
In context though, by the time Romer came down there had been two more
state initiatives and we’d beaten both of them, including one in Idaho.8 And
lower courts, by and large, blew the Romer case off. There are far too many
opinions explaining why Romer is only about its specific facts.9 As the Eleventh
Circuit once famously said, “Romer is no employment case.”10
Doesn’t a case that says that a state can’t change its constitution to fence a
group out of the usual political process speak with a breadth greater than a
garden variety employment case? Not to most federal courts that looked at it
afterwards.11
The next important case in Justice Kennedy’s (and the Court’s) LGBT
cannon is Lawrence v. Texas.12 Lawrence got the monkey of Bowers v.
Hardwick13 off our back.
Bowers v. Hardwick quickly evolved from a case about the Due Process
Clause of the federal Constitution to a case that answered almost every
constitutional question that came up about gay people. Equal protection for
LGBT people? “No, see Bowers v. Hardwick.”14 First Amendment, “No, see
Bowers v. Hardwick.”15 We were just waiting for the contract case involving
lesbians in which the courts would say “unenforceable, Bowers v. Hardwick.”
Taking that monkey off our back was a critical important step, but the
significance of Lawrence was certainly diminished by what I think was the most
effective dissenting opinion written in the second half of the twentieth century—
Antonin Scalia’s masterpiece in Lawrence.16 In that dissent, Justice Scalia did
two remarkable things. First, he convinced lower courts that the correct way to
7. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
8. David Dunlap, Gay Politicians Cite Gains amid Losses, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1994, at B9; Idaho
Initiative History: Initiative 1, IDAHO SECRETARY ST.: ELECTION DIVISION (Nov. 8, 1994),
https://sos.idaho.gov/elect/inits/inithist.htm; Initiative, Referendum and Recall, OR. SECRETARY ST.,
https://sos.oregon.gov/blue-book/Documents/elections/initiative.pdf (last visited May 13, 2019).
9. See, e.g., Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 827 (11th Cir. 2004);
Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289, 295 (6th Cir. 1997); State v. Limon,
83 P.3d 229, 240 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004), rev'd, 122 P.3d 22 (Kan. 2005).
10. Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1110 (11th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
11. For a notable exception occasioned by a near incomprehensible attempt to argue Romer away, see
Stemler v. City of Florence, 126 F.3d 856, 874 (6th Cir. 1997).
12. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
13. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
14. See, e.g., High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 571 (9th Cir. 1990),
implied overruling recognized by SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471 (9th Cir. 2014);
Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
15. See Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 692 (D.C. Cir 1994) (en banc).
16. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586–605 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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understand Lawrence was found not in anything said in the majority opinion,
but rather in his dissent, which despite the majority opinion’s plain “balancing”
of personal liberty against state endorsed morality, branded it “an unheard-of
form of rational-basis review,” one “so out of accord with our jurisprudence” as
to be unjustifiable under either American constitutional law or the jurisprudence
of “any society we know.17
For the first few years after Lawrence, most lower courts treated it as sui
generis and inapplicable to anything but its own facts because they saw it as a
completely unjustifiable rational basis case and for this, they cite Justice Scalia’s
dissent.18 Amazing.
Even more important from a political standpoint, Justice Scalia’s dissent
effectively turns what could have been a moment to celebrate that LGBT people
are not necessarily criminals anymore, into a dire warning that marriage for
same-sex couples is the inevitable next step.
“Do not believe it,” Justice Scalia warns, when the majority opinion says
Lawrence does not address whether government has to allow same-sex couples
to marry.19 That call to arms to those opposed to any form of equality for LGBT
people helped fuel a political campaign aimed at preemptively stopping
marriage. That campaign wound up burying us with twenty-six state
constitutional amendments in the next three election cycles, amendments that
took away all governmental power to recognize same-sex couples.20 To be that
effective politically and that effective judicially, the dissent it seems to me walks
away with both the political and judicial honors in Lawrence v. Texas.
United States v. Windsor is a hugely important case because it set off a rash
of district court, and circuit court decisions saying that states had to let same-sex
couples marry.21 Those decisions came fast and furious after Windsor, and their
momentum, I think, led to Obergefell, the decision requiring the states to allow
same-sex couples to marry, much sooner than it might have come without
them.22 There is some reason to think that is not what the Court wanted to do. In
Hollingsworth v. Perry, a companion to Windsor in which the issue was whether
the Constitution required states to allow same-sex couples to marry, Justice
Kennedy famously expressed reservations about deciding the issue, given that it
was a new phenomenon.23 Perhaps tellingly, the last sentence of Windsor,

17. Id. at 586, 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
18. See, e.g., Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 51 n.5 (1st Cir. 2008), Sylvester v. Fogley, 465 F.3d 851, 857
(8th Cir. 2006); Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d 808, 817–18 (7th Cir. 2005); Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Children
& Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 815–16 (11th Cir. 2004).
19. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
20. See Haeyoun Park, Gay Marriage State by State: From a Few States to the Whole Nation, N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/03/04/us/gay-marriage-state-by-state.html (last visited May 13,
2019).
21. See 570 U.S. 744, 752 (2013).
22. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
23. Transcript of Oral Argument at 48–49, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693 (2013) (No. 12-144).
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reminiscent of Bush v. Gore,24 says that “[t]his opinion and its holdings are
confined to those lawful marriages” (referring to marriages of same-sex couples
recognized by state law).25
Then there is Obergefell itself.26 Look, the truth is that those of us who
were involved in advocacy for marriage at the time, we had about run the table
on states where the legislatures or state courts still had the power to provide
marriage for same-sex couples.27 We were thus looking at a seven to fifteen year
fight to take down those state constitutional amendments that took away state
power to allow same-sex couples to marry, at first by getting them repealed at
the ballot box, and then perhaps with Romer-like court decisions invalidating
them, waiting at some point for the Supreme Court to step in and bring whatever
states remained into line. By stepping in when it did, the Court greatly truncated
what would have been a bloody, ugly, expensive, long battle. Had Obergefell
resulted in a huge blow-back, one could argue about whether that battle should
have been avoided or not. I think looking at the way things have played out—
that U.S. society has largely accepted marriage by same-sex couples—the
decision did us a great favor.
Particularly in Obergefell, Kennedy’s LGBT opinions for the Court
constitute an important political legacy. But to be honest, there isn’t much of a
jurisprudential legacy here. The biggest disappointment has to be the Court’s
failure to tell us how courts should look at laws that single LGBT people out for
different treatment. In four cases about laws that explicitly singled LGBT people
out for different treatment, the Court never told us. Are laws that discriminate
presumptively constitutional subject to rational basis review? Or are they to
some degree suspect? We just don’t know.
Now, some people would say, “It’s a trivial problem, isn’t it? After
Obergefell, this is really over.” I don’t think so.
Every major civil rights movement in this Country has been met with the
insistence by some of those who disapprove of the newly protected minority that
they ought to have a conscience-based First Amendment right to discriminate
and be exempted from nondiscrimination laws.28 A similar assault on laws that
protect LGBT people from discrimination has already begun, and the favorite
way of lawyers and judges to allow a conscience opt-out from sexuality
nondiscrimination laws, and not to gut all of our country’s civil rights laws, is to
say that laws that prohibit race discrimination and gender discrimination apply
to classifications which the Supreme Court has said are inherently suspicious
and worthy of close review. Thus, the argument goes, preventing discrimination
24. 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000).
25. Windsor, 570 U.S. at 775.
26. 135 S. Ct. 2584.
27. See Park, supra note 20.
28. See, e.g., Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 F.2d 1389, 1397–98 (4th Cir. 1990) (claimed
religious right to pay women less); Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 256 F. Supp. 941, 945 (D.S.C. 1966), rev’d
on other grounds, 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (refusal to serve African-Americans at restaurant on religious grounds).
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on those bases is compelling. Not so, the argument concludes, laws against
discrimination based on sexual orientation, since the Court has never held that
those classifications are suspect.29 I predict this argument will be a significant
factor, in what will be a pitched battle about whether you get conscience-based
exemptions from nondiscrimination laws that protect LGBT people. It matters.
There’s a similar though less obvious failure in Lawrence. It never tells us
whether the right to form a relationship with someone of the same sex is so basic
that states cannot use it as a basis for different treatment without an important
purpose and a demonstration that the different treatment is needed. Though the
Court did use the kind of balancing that is the hallmark of less deferential
review,30 and while the Court may have had good reasons for avoiding the
nomenclature of fundamental rights, and though the case law in the area may be
wobbly, a clearer statement would have made Lawrence harder for lower courts
to brush off.31
If you look beyond what you might call a parochial LGBT view, those
decisions are equally jurisprudentially disappointing.
Since the ’70s, there’s been a small, but very important disagreement about
the consequences of being able to prove that the government passed a law
treating people differently not because of some fair notion of difference in terms
of its purpose, but in order simply to treat the group of people in question
differently. If you can actually prove that different treatment itself was the
purpose, does that invalidate the law, subject it to more searching review, or can
a law be saved by making up a rationale which we know to be false?32
The Romer case is written in a way that circles around that question and
completely avoids it. The Windsor case maybe suggests that you take a closer
look when you’ve got actual proof of an improper purpose.33 As hopeful as
Windsor was, the opinion in Trump v. Hawaii,34 an opinion which Justice
Kennedy says in a short concurrence that he fully supports, suggests again that

29. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 32–33, Masterpiece
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111). I’ve explained elsewhere
why this argument makes little sense. See Brief for American Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondent at 18 n.14, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (No. 99-699). Nonetheless,
it has persistent appeal to some. See, e.g., Smith v. Fair Emp't & Hous. Comm'n, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 395, 404 (Ct.
App. 1994), rev'd on other grounds, 913 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1996).
30. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
31. See, e.g., Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 51 n.5 (1st Cir. 2008), Sylvester v. Fogley, 465 F.3d 851, 857
(8th Cir. 2006); Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d 808, 817–18 (7th Cir. 2005); Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Children
& Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 815–16 (11th Cir. 2004).
32. For a case suggesting an improper purpose invalidates, see Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433–34
(1984). For cases suggesting a more searching review, see City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S.
432, 450 (1985), and U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 537–38 (1973). For a case insisting that a
made up rationale will save an otherwise invalid law, see Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356,
370–74 (2001).
33. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 768, 770 (2013).
34. 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018).
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a made up rationale will save a discriminatory policy at least in the context of
the religion clauses, at least in the context of immigration.35
The missed opportunities to answer important questions about implicit
rights in Lawrence and Obergefell seem to me even more disappointing than the
missed opportunity to answer equality questions in Romer and Windsor. In
Lawrence, the plaintiffs and their friends made an important argument about
how to understand the contours of implicitly protected rights. That argument
said in effect, “If you’re going to use history to decide what it is that we’ve
always more or less understood to be beyond the power of the government, you
shouldn’t just use the history of what’s been protected from government
interference by law. You should look at larger social and political history of what
has been understood to be more or less off the table.”36
So for example, the argument went, we’ve always behaved as a society that
parents have a right to apply mild corporal discipline to their children even
though that violates laws against assault. That tells us that parental discipline has
always been understood to be off the table, even though the law technically said
otherwise.37 Justice Kennedy flirts with the idea, but then drops it and doesn’t
use it as a basis of the decision at all.38
There was an equally important point about implicit rights that the
Lawrence Court could have addressed: while we may use history to discover the
contours of an implicitly-protected right, we don’t use the history of who got to
exercise it to decide who has the right today. Prior to Bowers v. Hardwick, many
of the important cases in which the Court found an implicit right could not have
been decided as they were had the right been limited to those who had a historic
right to it.39
If you want to see a good explanation of the point, read Chief Judge Judith
Kay’s dissenting opinion in Hernandez v. Robles.40 The Lawrence opinion never
touches the issue.

35. Id. at 2420. I don’t think though that Trump actually settles the question. Apart from the fact that
immigration may constitute a “special case,” the Court goes on to say, as it often does after declaiming any need
to evidence, to cite “persuasive evidence” that the policy in fact had a legitimate basis. Id. at 2421–23.
36. See, e.g., Brief for Professors of History as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 10–20, Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102); Brief for Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at
9–16, Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (No. 02-102); Brief for American Civil Liberties Union & ACLU of Texas as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 11–26, Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (No. 02-102).
37. Brief for Professors of History as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note 36, at 10–20; Brief
for Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note 36, at 9–16; Brief for American Civil
Liberties Union & ACLU of Texas as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note 36, at 11–26.
38. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 568–71. Justice Scalia, recognizing the potential of the idea to expand the
coverage of implicit rights, made sure to take it on in his dissent. See id. at 595–98 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
39. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
40. 855 N.E.2d 1, 23–27 (N.Y. 2006) (Kaye, J., dissenting), abrogated by Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct.
2584 (2015); see also Matthew Coles, Lawrence v. Texas and the Refinement of Substantive Due Process, 16
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 23, 42–48 (2005).
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Perhaps the most disappointing opinion is the Obergefell opinion, at least
in part because it aimed so high and fell so far short. For years, Justice Kennedy,
Justice Souter and other Justices said that, while history might be a starting point
for deciding the contours of implicit rights, it shouldn’t be the ending point.41
We should be able, those opinions argued, to bring historical understandings
forward into the present.42 In Obergefell, Justice Kennedy laid out four different
inquiries that he offered as a way to do just that.43 These factors, the Justice tells
us, will show us how to separate the essentials of the implicit right to marry from
unimportant historical trappings.
As much as I respect the Obergefell opinion as a political milestone, I think
those four factors as explained in the opinion tell us mostly what Justice
Kennedy admired about the institution of marriage. They don’t tell us a great
deal about how to separate the essential elements of a fundamental right from
outmoded details.
Some think trying to come up with a principled way of using the way
history has evolved to understand the contours of an implicit right is a lost cause.
While not a full blown theoretical take, I highly recommend Judge Vaughn
Walker’s decision in the California marriage case, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, in
which he uses the legal and social evolution of the institution of marriage as a
way to identify the essential elements of a recognized implicit fundamental
right.44 As Judge Walker shows, while gender was an essential element of the
legal and social institution of marriage one hundred years ago, marriage is much
less socially gendered and no longer legally gendered at all. From that, he
concludes that sex is not a part of the essential fundamental right.45 It’s a brilliant
piece of work and shows that achieving a contemporary understanding of an
implicit right identified by history is something that can be done. Obergefell
swings for the same fences, but in my view it’s a strikeout.
In context, and I want to put this back into context, I think these four
opinions reflect the profound emotional commitment of a very decent human
being to right a great historical wrong. For that moral commitment, one that
likely overcame many of the values on which he was raised, we should respect
and admire the man. I do.
I am also deeply grateful for not having to have engaged in the trench
warfare over state constitutional amendments that time has shown us was, in
terms of national acceptance of a profound change, unnecessary.
A legal legacy requires something else. But let’s not dwell on what it is not
here. Let’s look instead at that profound commitment to righting a great historic

41. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Washington
v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 765 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring).
42. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571–72.
43. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2584, 2598–2603.
44. 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 992–93 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
45. Id.
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wrong and how important those four decisions were in righting it, and respect
the man for that.

70.5-COLES (DO NOT DELETE)

June 2019]

5/27/2019 9:45 AM

JUSTICE ANTHONY KENNEDY'S LGBT DECISIONS

***

1207

